Post from Mark

This is a wonderful exploration into what constitutes the “right” reading pedagogy. Williams, again, provides a fairly well-rounded background of the genesis and evolution of different theories for literacy development. I really like the way Williams enlightens us to the notion of political forces playing such huge role in implemented pedagogies; the fact is very sad. Where the separation between whole language and phonics is concerned, I could not help but feel compelled to side with the way in which I was taught. Objectively though I guess I felt compelled to consider each side.
There seem to be a strong logic in the “decoding” aspect of phonics (155). We can imagine a child developing skills which allow for the uncovering of meaning in a sentence, or, even deeper, the sounds of letters within words and meaning derived from such approach. Given this, Flesh’s psycholinguistic theory works for my understanding of literacy development.
Whole-language possesses an appeal of almost accepting that the phonics people missed something –the extent of meaning in a word. The examples of the way the word, “house” operates in different ways in sentences shows clearly what seems to be a shortcoming of the phonics side (157). I however like to give credence to the whole-language people as far as the extended meanings of words. But such a paradigm for reading pedagogy cannot capture the complexity of language alone—neither side can. Therein lays the trouble with these systems. Linguistics calls into play a myriad of cognitive operations which co-work together in intricate ways.
I can think back to reading on Wittgenstein and his criticism of St Augustine’s views on the ways in which a child comes to know language. St Augustine likens the process to a strange coming into a new country language and trying to learn the language with no background of it (A.D. 39-38). Wittgenstein argues that the child in ST. Augustine’s model does not already possess a language as Augustine implied. The notion applies itself to a common language and does not account for variables in the constructs of different languages. In this respect, one can see how the whole language people may adopt or point to segment of Wittgenstein’s linguistics in order to support their stance. After all Wittgenstein’s philosophy may show what the whole language people are re-demonstrating. But nevertheless, considering the limits of a bottom-up method of phonics approach, we can see how meaning or the extent of possible meanings of words can go far beyond that allowed for in such approach.
Still, whole language opens Pandora’s Box in the sense that it may jeopardize the very framework of the language by allowing for local interpretations of meanings and even pronunciation of words (155). We are confronted, then, with the dangers of such a liberal ideology. The question remains whether or not the rigidity of phonics’ conservatism will accommodate the vastness of meaning in words .As well, can whole-language completely dilute the very framework of our language? I think, as a pedagogy, we cannot settle on one over the other, completely.